A new approach to automating the fault tree construction process is proposed. The methodology has features which make it applicable to binary state systems and also to process control systems. Previous attempts to model the failure generation in systems have worked well on only a small sub-class of system types and have failed to produce a generally applicable method. Thus in some previous approaches there are desirable features which are worth retaining in a new construction method. The new method is based on the flexibility of the decision table method but incorporates a way of detecting, classifying and analysing control loops, similar to that used with operators in the digraph approach. As well as using operators to deal with control loops a new operator is introduced that deals with two-state circuits. This will mean that when constructing the fault trees, the difficulty of handling repeated events will be eliminated and the size of the tree structures will be significantly reduced. The developed algorithm can produce a tree format appropriate for direct input to an analysis code. The method is demonstrated in this paper by its application to a simplified safety system from the railway industry. This system has been selected as it exhibits features that are typical of two-state circuitry but is also small enough to illustrate the new developments introduced.
NOTATION
results in a tree structured diagram representing how the component failures, human actions and software errors contribute to the cause of a specified system failure C current mode. By providing data for the basic events the tree CONT contacts can be analysed to yield the minimal cut sets and system DE de-energized failure probability or frequency. EN energized Unfortunately, the development process for fault trees F failed is a very time intensive activity. Fault trees for the L line WASH 1400 nuclear reactor study (2) took many man NC no current years of effort to construct. Once the trees have been RY relay developed they can be submitted to one of the many W working computer codes which perform the quantitative analysis. Also, since there are no rigorous rules which, if applied to a system, guarantee the generation of the correct fault tree, the quality of trees produced manually is very 1 INTRODUCTION dependent on the experience and abilities of the engineer who has produced them. These two factors, time and Many different industries are now required to conduct quality, have been the main driving forces behind the risk assessments of their activities. This involves the research into ways in which fault tree construction can identification of potentially hazardous events and an be implemented on a computer. To date there have been assessment of their consequences and frequency of many attempts to develop such a code. The most successoccurrence. Once the risk associated with any activity ful have been based on digraph approaches (3-5), has been evaluated its acceptability must then be judged. decision tables (6), expert systems (7) and functional One of the most popular approaches to determine the equations (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) . Despite the amount of work carried frequency of occurrence of hazardous events is provided out in this area, a commercial package has yet to become by fault tree analysis (1). The application of this method available. Deficiencies are reported in the literature for these methods (13).
The MS was received on 3 June 1996 and was accepted for publication on 24 June 1997. applied to the control systems for chemical processing to occupy the same section of track at any one time. To plant. The nature of such plant, and in particular the insure this a train detection system is incorporated on process control systems, means that it does not facilitate each section, the running rails of each section are electriaccurate fault tree development. The major difficulties cally isolated from the sections on either side by insuarise due to the necessity to model continuous process lation blocks; such a section is illustrated in Fig. 2 . When variables for chemical plant and also electrical circuits the track section is unoccupied electric current flows which are mainly two-state.
around the circuit and energizes the track relay which This paper explores the possibility of using a hybrid causes a green signal allowing a train to enter this secmethod derived from two existing methods which would tion. If a train is in the section, the leading wheels and be appropriate to model two-state and continuously axle, being made of steel provide a short circuit between variable safety systems. The new approach combines the the tracks. Therefore the relay is de-energized, causing features of the decision table and digraph methods and the signal to display red until the train has left the secalso incorporates some developments new to this tion. If a train attempts to enter an occupied section, the methodology.
'train stop' located at the signal causes the train brakes It is not possible to describe the full analysis of a to activate. On automatic trains there is equipment to complex system in this paper, so in order to demonstrate detect whether track circuit current is flowing or not. If an application of these methods a simple train detection a flow was not detected in the section, the emergency system from the railway industry has been selected. In brake would be applied. this way, the main features and their advantages/disad-In the analysis presented here failures of the insulating vantages can be illustrated. The method is, however, blocks between sections were not taken into considerapplicable to systems from any industry.
ation. This restricted the analysis to enable the major features of the technique to be demonstrated on a relatively simple example. By restricting the analysis from 2 OVERVIEW OF THE FAULT TREE tracing faults and failures of adjacent sections, it was CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM anticipated that the features of the technique would be clearer. The system shown in Fig. 2 is relevant when The data flow chart showing the overall approach is there is no train in the section and so the signal is green. shown in Fig. 1 . The system description is entered as a When a train is present in the section the first axle is schematic diagram [such as a piping and instrumentation represented by the line labelled 3. It is considered here diagram (P & ID) for process plant] using the facilities that no train present will represent the normal case when in Auto Cad. From the entered drawing a file is created there will be no current path from line 2 to line 3. If that holds the topology information for the system. This there is no train and the circuit made there is current to includes information defining how the components are the relay which energizes the relay coil, the contacts then connected together. There is a component decision table make the connection to the green bulb. G1 and G2 are library that holds all decision tables; any of these independent power supplies for each circuit. decision tables can be amended or new decision tables
The two failures of concern for this system are: added using the generic component editor. A top event, the causes of which are to be traced, is entered into the 1. Failure of the red signal when a train is present. fault tree construction program. The program produces 2. Failure of the green signal when a train is not present. the fault tree structure which it writes to an output file that can be read by commercial fault tree analysis packages. The current version of the software is written for 4 BASIC DECISION TABLE METHOD compatibility with a specific analysis package, but since the basic structure of information is common to most For information on the background of the use of analysis codes other interfaces could be created with decision tables in fault tree construction see reference minor effort. Using the analysis package, qualitative and (6). The main advantage of this method is that no quantitative analyses can be performed giving the top restriction is placed on the number of discrete states used event probability or frequency of occurrence. This type to represent variable deviations. This method requires of approach using the computer aided design (CAD) the construction of a tabular model to represent the funcinterface would facilitate performance of reliability tioning/failure of any component. Each component assessments at the design stage, a practice which is not input (connection) from other components in the system widely performed at present.
is combined with the component state (i.e. working or a failure mode) to give outputs which are passed on to 3 SYSTEM EXAMPLE other elements of the system. Therefore to perform a decision table analysis it is necessary to have a model for each component in the system and a system topology To lessen the risk of collision between trains, the track is divided into sections and two trains are not allowed which links the component input and output ports to show how the system is constructed. A topology diagram for a component, consider the relay contacts which move position to light the appropriate signal. First the failure for the train detection system when a train is present is shown in Fig. 3 .
modes of the contact have to be decided upon. It is up to the analyst how many modes are included in the As an example of how to construct a decision table Fig. 3 ) there are two inputs, these being the current supply from line 12 (L12) have been considered are, for example, the contacts welding in either of the two circuit positions. The choice and the relay (RY ) state which fixes the contact position selected from the links to the green and red signals. For of failure modes considered is generally governed by the input events or will produce a non-minimal set of causes.
The decision tables for the other components have been
FAULT TREE CONSTRUCTION
The method of fault tree construction using decision each of the output connections, two variable states, tables will be illustrated for the top event green lamp off namely, current (C ) and no current (NC ) are of concern.
(GLOFF ) for the train detection system when there is A table ( Table 1) is constructed which considers all no train present. First the decision table for the compopossible combinations of inputs from line 12 in a column nent whose output contains the top event variable is labelled IN1, inputs from the relay in a column labelled found. Then the output column of this table is searched IN2, the system state and the effects that these events for occurrences of the top event variable in the specified will have on the outputs to the green and red signals state, in this case OFF. Table 2 presents the signal/bulb (columns labelled OUT1 and OUT2 respectively).
decision table, which contains the top event variable. For Entries to the table are determined by considering the the bulb, the entry OFF appears twice in OUT1, these output events. There is only one situation that can cause are in rows 2 and 3. Since there is more than one cause current in output 1 (the green signal connection), which of this event an OR gate is used at the top event structure is current in line 12 (C IN1), the relay energized (EN in the fault tree to combine these two possibilities as IN2) and the contacts working ( W ). Similarly there is direct causes of the top event. As row 2 only contains only one cause of current in output 2, which is current the failure state of the component, this is added to the in line 12 (C IN1), relay de-energized (DE IN2), and OR gate as a basic event and the next row is dealt with. contacts working ( W ). These conditions are incorpor-In row 3 there is only one entry in the input and state ated in the first two lines of the contacts decision table  columns (NC IN1) , if there were two or more entries illustrated in Table 1 . Turning to causes for no current, then these would be entered in the fault tree as inputs NC, in output 1, there are three ways in which this result to an AND gate. Each of these events are then expanded can occur: in turn. By examining the system topology diagram 1. NC in IN1 will cause NC in OUT1 and OUT2 regard-( Fig. 3) it can be seen that IN1 for the green bulb (GB) less of the relay state (IN2) or the state of the connects to the contacts (CONT ) OUT1. Therefore, the component.
variable and its value (NC IN1) for the bulb is traced 2. The relay (IN2) being de-energized will cause NC in directly to its cause (NC OUT1) for the contacts. In the OUT1 regardless of IN1 or the component state.
contacts decision table entries for NC in OUT1 are 3. If the contacts fail there will be NC in OUT1 or OUT2 sought. Three matches are found (rows 3-5, Table 1 ). regardless of the input states.
Each of these events is then added to the fault tree giving The situations are shown in rows 3-5 of the contacts the top event structure shown in Fig. 4 . Undeveloped decision table. events are each expanded in turn until the fault tree is There are also three ways which produce NC in completed. Any working states incorporated on the fault output 2, two of these have already been described in tree at this stage are then transformed in terms of failure cases 1 and 3 above. The remaining case is when the events, i.e. NOT gates containing the component relay is energized and the contacts work which gives failures. OUT2 NC regardless of the status of IN1. Incorporating Prior to adding each event from the decision tables to this combination gives the final decision table for the form the input to a gate, an identifier is attached to the contacts shown in Table 1 .
gate as in Fig. 4 . The identifier is constructed from the The '-' in the input and state columns indicates the component name and, depending on how many matches 'don't care' condition, which means that the specified are found in the decision table for the event, either the input states will result in the specified output event row number or output column number is included. If regardless of the value of the variable. The final fault tree needs only to represent the necessary and sufficient Contacts Col0
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Relay Row1 there is more than one match in the decision table then 5.1 The identification of repeated and inconsistent the output column number is used, otherwise the row events number will be used. This identifier is used to check for Before a gate is added to a branch of the tree, the new inconsistent and repeated events. A repeated event identifier is compared character by character with all the occurs in the fault tree when the system being tackled other identifiers above it on that branch. If there is a contains circuits. Inconsistent events are those which complete match then this is a repeated event, no varicannot cause the events appearing at higher levels in the tree structure.
ables need to be tested. If there is a match apart from 3. An inconsistent event which is input to an OR gate is dealt with in exactly the same manner as that for
The tree structures produced by this method are very large and contain too many unnecessary branches. A modification to the method that yields more concise tree the last number, which indicates the row of the relevant structures and hence lessens the amount of time spent decision table, then there may be a repeated or an inconchecking for repeated and inconsistent events would be sistent event depending on the variable inputs in each of of real benefit. This efficiency can be gained by utilizing the rows. For this case the method used for identification a structure similar to the type of operator found in the will be described with reference to an example. The idendigraph technique. tifiers that include the output column number are not checked for matches as repeated or inconsistent events will be detected when this is expressed in terms of its 6 MODIFIED DECISION TABLE APPROACH rows later in the tree.
Consider the two identifiers RELAY ROW 1 and RELAY ROW 2. The decision table for the relay is
The main weakness in the decision table method in its shown in Table 3 . The relay has two outputs in the original form is its inability to detect, classify and analyse system, the first is to line 6 (L6) and the second to the control loops and circuits. Therefore modifications have contacts (CONT ). In the first instance consider output been made to the basic method to consider these situfor both identifiers coming from line 6, i.e. the first ations. The decision tables are modified to incorporate output column, then the entries in output column 1 are a gain which indicates how deviations in the input varicurrent (C ) and no current (NC ) for each of the rows able affect the output state. This gain is rather like that respectively. As no one branch of a fault tree can contain used with the directed edges in the digraph method. The the same component twice with mutually exclusive varigain takes a sign value which is + or − depending on able states, in this case C and NC, these two events are the relationship between the input and output variables. inconsistent events. On the other hand, if the output for If, for example, an increase in an input variable causes the second identifier came from the contacts, then the an increase in the output variable then the associated output variables cannot be compared as they are to gain would be positive since there is a direct relationship different components. In this case the input variables to between these variables. On the other hand, if an increase the rows need to be compared as these will be the next in an input variable causes a reduction in an output variables that are expanded in the tree. Only input colvariable then the gain would be negative, i.e. an indirect umns that do not contain any 'don't care' states are relationship. The other main change to the format of the compared and the state column is ignored. So in this decision tables is the inclusion of an EXCLUSIVE state case the only variables to be compared are from input row. This row is incorporated in the decision table so column 1, namely current (C ) and no current (NC ); that mutually exclusive component states are identified therefore, as before, this event would be an inconsistent and hence inconsistent events can be reduced from the event. If the variables had matched then there would tree using Boolean algebra. This row is added at the have been a repeated event.
bottom of the decision table to show all the states in which the component can reside. The first entry in the EXCLUSIVE row is the working state of the component, all subsequent entries are the possible failure states.
Rules for dealing with repeated and inconsistent
This information is used in fault trees which contain events basic events representing the component in its working state. The fault tree should contain only failure events 1. For a repeated event the branch of the tree where the second occurrence of the event appears is terminated and so the component working state is replaced by NOT any of its failed states. The keyword EXCLUSIVE and the next input event of the gate is expanded. The gate whose input event development was terminated appears in the table to identify the occurrence of this row, see Table 4 . In the new decision tables an identifier is not detected even if it now contains only one input.
For an inconsistent event which is an input to an
is also included that indicates if the component is a power supply. This takes the form of a P after the 3 AND gate, the branch of the tree is traversed upwards until an OR gate or the identifier which made the numbers in row 3 of the decision tables. For example if the decision table in Table 4 was a power supply the match is encountered (since any AND gate output event cannot now occur). Then the branch is termin-format of row 3 would become 2, 2, 1, P.
The new decision table format for the contacts is ated at this point and the next input event of the gate in the graph construction since it does not trace faults W, F back through the system and so the first of these events is ignored and only the second is traced. The red bulb connects to output column 2 of the contacts (system shown in Table 4 . The row containing NORMAL is used topology diagram) and the method is applied again. to provide a component identifier for situations when Each of the branches of the graph are terminated natthere is more than one component of the same type. For urally at the system boundary or when the new compoexample there might be two different types of valve in nent being added to the branch is a match with a the system then a unique identifier for each of the valves component which appears further up on the same would be entered in this row. In the third row of Table 4 branch. In this case the causes of an event have been the three numbers correspond to the number of inputs traced in a loop back to itself and the fault development in the table, the number of outputs in the table and the is terminated. The completed topology graph for 'red number of tables. There may be more than one table for bulb off when there is a train in the section' is shown the different variables, e.g. in a valve there may be one in Fig. 5 . to model temperature deviations and one to model Consider the termination of the branches labelled 3 flowrate deviations. For the contacts there are 2 inputs, and 5 in Fig. 5 . The last component added to the 2 outputs and only one table which traces the variable branches is L4 01 (output column 1). When these current. The fourth row is the gain row where the branches are traversed upwards towards the top event relationship between each of the input and output varithey both encounter the same event which is L4 01. As ables is stored. The order of the stored gains is such that the component name and output column match, the two each input is dealt with in turn and its relationship with branches are terminated. Other branches are terminated each of the outputs is added to the row of gains.
for similar reasons. From the topology graph all the possible loops and circuits can be identified. The gains relating input and 6.1 Loop/circuit identification output events for the components in the potential loops are used for the loop/circuit identification and classifi-Before the tree is constructed using the modified decision table method all of the loops and circuits in the system cation. As a NFB (negative feedback) loop and an electrical circuit have exactly the same characteristics on a need to be identified, these are identified by using the topology of the system. This will be demonstrated again topology graph apart from the sign of the total gain for the loop (as described below), only two loop detection using the train detection system example.
The first step in the construction of the fault tree for algorithms need to be introduced, one for NFF (negative feedforward) loops and the second for NFB loops. The the train detection system for the top event 'red signal off when there is a train in the section' is to build up the algorithm for the detection of the NFB loops is the simplest as it only involves scanning one branch at a time. topology graph of the system. This is achieved by using the decision tables together with the topology diagram ( Fig. 3) to link each of the system components as the variable states are traced from the top event back 6.2 Negative feedback loop/circuit detection through the system. A topology graph is a directed graph consisting of nodes and edges. The nodes represent
The characteristic of the NFB loop is that it has the ability to correct moderate disturbances in the sensed specific values of the output variables for the component identified. The edges link the nodes such that those nodes variable. To identify a NFB loop from the topology graph a path must exist that starts and ends with the directly below any other nodes contribute to their cause. The topology graph unlike a fault tree does not, how-same variable with a resulting negative product of the gains. If there is a path starting and ending at the same ever, indicate how these events need to combine. A node on a topology graph represents an input event from a variable with a positive overall gain it identifies either a positive feedback loop (which does not need special row of a decision table. As each new node is added to the graph, the component identifier, output column treatment since it will be detected on a system start-up) or a circuit. A circuit requires other conditions such as loop can, in theory, prevent the disturbance progressing through the system. This is achieved by sensing an power supply to be contained on the loop. For the identification process each of the branches of the topology upstream variable and manipulating a downstream variable. A NFF control loop features two paths in the tree is dealt with, one at a time. Each node on the branch is compared with every other node above it on the system structure, a causative path and a corrective path. These features are identified on a topology graph by branch for a match. To obtain a match three criteria must be met: paths which progress upward from a common node which occurs on two or more branches and the upward (a) the component type and numbers must match; paths converge at a second node. In other words there (b) the output column number must match; and need to be two or more paths between two components (c) the output variable must match.
in the system. In this example, it can be seen from Fig. 5 that the The rules for the method of detection are: first match appears on branch 1 with the components 1. Only deal with branches that have a common end generator 2, output column 1 and variable NC. So the node. path of the first potential NFB loop or circuit is 2. For two branches with a common end node traverse GEN2 CONT GB T4 L12 GEN2 (i.e. generaup the topology graph to locate the second common tor 2 contacts green bulb T-connector line 12 node where the branches meet. generator 2). Once all the branches have been traversed 3. The resultant gains on each path of the branches are in this way the resulting loops need to be compared then evaluated. If the resultant gains are of a different against each other for duplicates. If two loops contain sign then the loop is a NFF loop, otherwise the loop the same components but in one loop current is being can be discarded. traced and in the other no current is traced, then these loops are treated as completely separate loops and are both retained in the list. If any duplicates are found these 7 FAULT TREE CONSTRUCTION repetitions can be discarded. In this example there are a possible six NFB loops or circuits.
When control loops or circuits are encountered during 1 cont(02) bulbR(02) t4(01) line12(01) fault tree construction 'operators' are utilized which gen2 (01) develop causes of the failure events being traced by con-2 gen2(01) cont(01) bulbG(01) t4(01) sidering the failure of the loop or circuit as a single entity. line12 (01) The fault tree is constructed in the usual manner, but 3,4 line4(01) relay (01) line6(01) line7(01) as each new component is encountered in the tree proaxle(02) line8 (01) line9(01) gen1(01) duction a check is made as described in Section 5 to see line1 (01) (14) are The state of the variable that is traced round each applied. If the component lies on a circuit, the new circuit circuit is as follows:
operator is applied.
(1) No current (2) No current (3) Current (4) No current (5) Current (6) No current 7.1 Circuit operators Once all of the possible NFB loops have been detected There at two circuit operators. The first is applicable these loops have to be classified as either NFB or circuits.
when the no current situation is traced around the cir-This is where the gain contained in the modified decision cuit. This first operator is illustrated in Fig. 6 and can tables is used. If loop 1 above is considered, the relationbe summarized as follows: ships between the appropriate inputs and outputs for all the components on the loop are extracted from the 1. A failure of any component in the circuit will cause appropriate decision tables. In this case they are all posithe open circuit condition with no current. Therefore, tive. So when the product of the gains is taken, the resultdeal with all components in turn adding their relevant ant gain is also positive. This, together with the fact that failure states to an OR gate (right-hand branch). the loop contains a power source (gen2), indicates that 2. When each component is being dealt with, the the path between the common components is a circuit. decision tables are checked to see if there are any external inputs to the circuit at that component. Any entries of NC in the input that traces the path around 6.3 NFF loop detection the circuit can be ignored as this just represents the circuit continuity. If there are, then these external Whereas feedback loops correct disturbances which currently exist in the system, a NFF (negative feedforward) inputs must be examined. If the external input is any state of the variable current then this external is incon-From the topology graph in Fig. 5 and the decision tables for the components there are six circuits. Initially sistent and can be ignored. Otherwise the external the tree is developed in the normal manner as shown in input is expanded using the decision tables as with Fig. 8 until the identifier BULBrow3 is added. The only any other variable state in the fault tree ( left-hand input to row3 is NC, the topology graph shows that this branch).
input is connected to OUT2 of the contacts. So the next When current flowing in a circuit is traced then for this component to be dealt with is Cont(02) NC. The six condition all the components in the circuit must be circuits are searched for this combination and a match working, so an AND gate appears in the operator, as is found in circuit 1. As this is the first circuit the only shown in Fig. 7 .
check that needs to be made is if the circuit contains a To demonstrate the use of the circuit operator it is power source, which it has in component gen2. A note necessary to consider the construction of the fault tree is made of the entry component to the circuit for consistency checks later, in this case it is the contacts. The for the train detection system with top event RBOFF. Table 4 , for the T-connector is shown in Table 5 . For consistency, the second circuit on which the is viewed for causes of NC in output 2, there are three matches in the output column and these occur in rows T-connector is located has to contain the input component on the loop being traced with the traced condition 3, 5 and 6: (a) NC,-,-; (b) -,-,F; or (c) -,EN,-. The inputs from any of the components on the circuit can be deleted matching the correct output column and also a power supply. Without these conditions it cannot affect the from the three matched rows as these just trace the path of the circuit. In this case the first input column is from fault conditions being traced. It can be seen from circuit 2 that it does contain a power supply, gen2, but L12 and the second from the relay, therefore since L12 is part of the circuit all inputs in column 1 can be ignored does not contain the component with the correct output column, i.e. Cont(02)NC. Therefore, no entries are ( left-hand branch of operator), which just leaves rows 5 and 6 to consider. As there are still two rows, an OR incorporated on the fault tree for this component. When the application of the circuit operator has been gate, G3, is added to G2 of the fault tree and these rows are expanded in turn. Row 5 of the contacts decision completed the stored external input to G3 is expanded. In this case the variable in input 2 of the contacts is EN. table contains only the component in its failure mode, therefore the failure (CSF ) is added to G3, see Fig. 8 . This is connected to the relay output column 2. As this variable and output column do not appear on any of Any inputs that are not from the circuit are described as external inputs, in this case the input in row 6 is from the circuits the fault tree is constructed in the normal manner. Output column 2 of the decision table for the the relay which is not on the circuit. When an external input is encountered the component name, output relay is searched for the variable state EN, only one match is found which is in row 1 of the table, the inputs column and variable are checked against all the inputs in the circuits, to see if it lies on one of the other circuits.
to row 1 are C (current) and W (working). As there are two inputs, an AND gate (G4), is added to the OR gate In this case relay 02 EN does not lie on any of the six circuits, therefore this event will be further expanded by G3 containing the input CSF. A NOT gate is then developed from G4 to deal with the working state of the relay. the normal fault tree techniques later. The next component on the circuit is BulbR(02), the component is dealt
The working state is converted to NOT failed states since with in the same manner as for the contacts. From the decision table for the bulb there are two matches in Table 5 Decision table for T-connector OUT2 for the variable NC, the matches occur in rows 2 and 3. As the bulb only has one input, this is the input 
